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Abstract:
In 1963, the Profumo affair brought Christine Keeler to public attention and
transformed her, briefly, into one of the most talked about women in the world.
Seeking to exploit her notoriety, Topaz Films entered into an agreement with
Keeler to make a cinematic version of her life story, The Keeler Affair. This article
explores some of the controversies surrounding The Keeler Affair, especially in
terms of the way in which the British Board of Film Censors dealt with the
film. The Keeler Affair was submitted to the BBFC on two occasions – once
when it was completed and then again in 1969 when Keeler’s memoirs were
serialised in the News of the World – and was rejected both times. On the second
occasion, The Keeler Affair was also submitted to, and rejected by, the Greater
London Council. The article seeks to establish some of the political factors
that shaped the BBFC’s and the GLC’s attitudes towards politically contentious
films, and demonstrates that the decisions made by the censors were guided
not simply by the content of The Keeler Affair, but also by personal relationships,
shared Establishment attitudes, concerns about public perceptions of the film
industry and a desire not to be drawn into political controversies. Consequently,
the article serves to reinforce the idea that censorship is best understood as a
dynamic process shaped by a host of determining factors, many of which might
best be described as extra- or para-cinematic.
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The Keeler Affair
‘May I have an assurance that no film dealing with the life of
Miss Keeler will be allowed to be shown in this country?’
(Irene Ward MP, House of Commons, 21 November 1963)
The film to which Irene Ward MP refers in her question is The
Keeler Affair (aka The Christine Keeler Story, The Christine Keeler Affair), a
90-minute Anglo-Danish co-production made in Copenhagen, telling
the life story of Christine Keeler, model, would-be actress and central
figure in the Profumo affair. Not only was The Keeler Affair not shown in
Britain in 1963, the year of the scandal that brought to public attention
both Christine Keeler and her former lover John Profumo, Minister for
War in Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government, it has to date
still not been given a release in the United Kingdom. Rather, it was
rejected twice by the British Board of Film Censors (BBFC), once, upon
its completion in December 1963, on the grounds of its supposedly
immoral themes and content, and then again in March 1970, when
distributors sought to exploit the renewed interest in Keeler prompted
by the publication of her memoirs in the News of the World. At the time
of the second unsuccessful application to the BBFC, the film was also
rejected by the Greater London Council (GLC), a decision which led
Keeler to observe that she was still considered ‘too hot to handle . . .
nearly a decade after the movie was made’ (2002: 240).
It was only in 1989, with the release of Scandal, that British
cinemagoers were treated to a cinematic take on the Profumo affair,
the series of events in which Profumo first misrepresented the nature
of his relationship with Keeler in a personal statement to the House
of Commons, and then resigned from Parliament having been forced
to admit that he had lied, his indiscretion made worse by the
supposed security risk posed by Keeler’s concurrent liaison with
Yevgeny ‘Eugene’ Ivanov, Soviet naval attaché-cum-spy. Keeler had met
Ivanov by way of her connection to Stephen Ward – libertine, portrait
artist and osteopath to the well-to-do – who enjoyed the company of
working-class girls such as Keeler and her friend Mandy Rice-Davies,
giving them deportment lessons à la Henry Higgins and introducing
them into the upper echelons of society (or at least those parts of it
looking for illicit sexual adventure).1 The fact that the production of
Scandal still proved contentious in the late 1980s – the actors involved
were even urged by the Bishop of Stepney, a friend of Profumo, to
withdraw from the project (Fuller 1989: 56)2 – should make evident
not only British society’s ongoing fascination with the Profumo affair,
but also the disagreements and controversies that continue to attend
the ways in which this particular scandal was, and continues to be,
conceptualised and debated.3
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The Profumo scandal filled thousands of column inches in 1963,
and the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was convinced that the
press saw the story as a means of ‘getting its own back’ on the
government following the Vassall affair, an earlier spy scandal (1973:
442).4 Contemporary press coverage contained numerous references
to the film that became The Keeler Affair, meaning that it enjoyed an
elevated cultural profile that simultaneously grew out of the affair and
helped to construct the ways in which the scandal was understood as
a cultural event as well as a political one. Indeed, the lasting image of
the scandal, Lewis Morley’s photograph of a naked Keeler sitting back-
to-front on a chair, was originally taken as a publicity still for the film.5
This article will explore The Keeler Affair as an element of the
Profumo scandal, with particular emphasis on its failure, in Britain
at least, to gain certification and a general release. In doing so, it
will focus in particular on the roles played and decisions made by the
BBFC and the GLC, and establish some of the political factors that
shaped these organisations’ attitudes towards politically controversial
films. Film censorship does not take place in a cultural vacuum, with
each production judged against a prescriptive list of dos and don’ts.
Rather, organisations responsible for censoring cinematic materials are
subject to a variety of constraints and pressures that influence the ways
in which individual films are judged at specific times. As will be shown,
although The Keeler Affair was assessed for its content (and, in 1963
at least, found wanting), the decisions made by the censors were also
guided by personal relationships, concerns about public perceptions
of the film industry, and a desire not to make contentious decisions.
Consequently, the article serves to reinforce the idea, advanced
elsewhere, for example by Macpherson (1980), Kuhn (1988), Street
(2000: 23–38) and Petley (2011), that censorship is best understood as
a dynamic process shaped by a host of determining factors, many of
which might best be described as extra- or para-cinematic.
For the BBFC, an organisation that sought simultaneously to
shape and react to public attitudes to popular culture and was
tasked with protecting the interests and reputation of the British
film industry from those who might use the content of individual
films to damn the medium as a whole, The Keeler Affair proved
problematic. Cinemagoers, the film industry, and the nation’s self-
appointed moral guardians in pulpits, in Parliament, and in the leader
columns and letters pages of the press – each wanted the BBFC to
prioritise their particular interests, reflect their tastes and pander to
their prejudices. In the case of The Keeler Affair, the BBFC’s generally
liberalising approach to questions of film censorship in the 1960s ran
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up against, and was limited by, its links with – and, one suspects,
broadly sympathetic attitudes to – the conventions, institutions and
members of an Establishment that came under considerable scrutiny
and pressure in the second half of 1963.6 Yet to focus solely on the
suggestion, made by some after both of The Keeler Affair’s rejections
by the BBFC, that the film had been subject to an act of political
censorship is to ignore that the 1960s were marked by both transition
and tradition, progressiveness and conservatism: questions of taste,
decency and discretion influenced the BBFC’s handling of the film,
and such questions were further complicated by British society’s
evolving and sometimes contradictory attitudes to consumerism, sex,
‘permissiveness’, deference, gender, youth and the role of the media.
That The Keeler Affair could still be considered uncertifiable in 1970,
that is after the supposedly pervasive social changes said by some
to characterise the 1960s had run their course, should encourage us
to recognise and assess the ways in which traditional attitudes and
Establishment privileges would prove to be a long time dying.
‘Morally objectionable’: The Keeler Affair and
the BBFC in 1963
The BBFC first learned of the plan to make a film based on Christine
Keeler’s life when John Nasht submitted a treatment to the Board
in the spring of 1963. The proposed film constituted an element
of Keeler’s attempts – encouraged, if not entirely orchestrated, by
the team of managers and business advisors that swiftly surrounded
her – to profit financially from what was anticipated to be a transient
moment in the spotlight. Such attempts, which appalled many
observers, went against what might previously have been expected of a
woman in Keeler’s position: she did not appear to be ashamed of her
life or her actions; she was not willing to accept her lot as a woman
of working-class origins; and she was not, most importantly, prepared
to stay silent.7 In his memoirs, John Trevelyan, then Secretary of the
BBFC, noted that on reading the treatment, which he evidently found
distasteful, he was concerned that the film might be defamatory or
libellous, and was also worried that it might encourage other young
women to ape Keeler in an attempt to seek notoriety and a short-
cut to fame and fortune. However, Trevelyan conceded that neither
of his concerns constituted ‘a legitimate ground for intervention’ by
the Board, and so he restricted himself to drafting a letter advising
Nasht to treat the subject with ‘moderation’ (1973: 175–6).
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Having drafted his letter, Trevelyan sought out a second opinion
from Arnold Goodman, the BBFC’s lawyer. Trevelyan claimed that
Goodman, who also provided legal advice to Labour Party leader
Harold Wilson and was a political insider, had knowledge of the ‘full
story’ of the Profumo affair and consequently knew which way the wind
was blowing. Goodman gave his opinion that the Board would be ‘fully
justified in strongly discouraging’ Nasht from making the film (ibid.:
176). Trevelyan, with Goodman’s help, wrote a second letter, which was
sent to Nasht on 6 May 1963. It adopted a radically different tone:
I can hold out no hope that a film made from this treatment, or one
dealing with this subject on the lines of this treatment, would be granted
any form of certificate by this Board. I could elaborate on the various
grounds why, in the public interest, this decision would in my opinion be
inevitable, but I feel that these grounds must be apparent to you without
further amplification.
Trevelyan added that there was nothing that the BBFC could do to
prevent Nasht producing and eventually submitting a film based on
Keeler’s life, but was very clear that the Board did not want to give ‘the
slightest encouragement’.8
Without reference to the treatment, a copy of which does not survive
in the BBFC file on The Keeler Affair, it is impossible to know with any
certainty which elements of the proposed film exercised the Board,
although any speculation would most likely focus on its sexual themes
and/or its political implications. Indeed, we cannot be sure that the
film as rejected by the censors in December 1963 was the same
film as outlined in the treatment dismissed by the Board in May.
Trevelyan’s belief that it was not necessary for the Board to explain
to Nasht precisely why it had taken against his initial treatment for
The Keeler Affair was, though, not entirely out of keeping with the
BBFC’s modus operandi at the time. British film censorship norms
were not formally codified, and practitioners were expected simply
to know and adhere to certain customs, standards and expectations
in relation to what could or could not be done.9 That Nasht sought
neither written clarification nor a personal meeting with Trevelyan to
discuss The Keeler Affair implies an understanding and an acceptance
of the BBFC’s reasoning and the way in which it was communicated.
The Board’s failure to articulate what it found problematic about the
treatment is not, therefore, necessarily suspicious.
However, it is also possible that Trevelyan was hiding behind the
taken-for-grantedness of cinema censorship in order to avoid having
to make explicit his political objections to the film, not least because of
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media interest in the Profumo scandal in general and The Keeler Affair
in particular. Simply stating that the ‘grounds must be apparent to you
without further amplification’ ran the risk of appearing deliberately
evasive, especially in relation to such a sensitive subject. Other BBFC
files from the period make clear that the Board frequently cooperated
with British film-makers to refine treatments, scripts and finished films,
especially in relation to sexual themes and content, in order that they
might be made suitable for certification and release in the United
Kingdom. The musical comedy Band of Thieves (1962), for example,
contained a number of coarse and sexually suggestive jokes that
Trevelyan insisted needed to be removed if the film was to gain a ‘U’
certificate; the producers cooperated with the Board and the film was
certified without issue.10 The BBFC’s aim was, wherever practicable, to
find ways to pass films rather than reasons to ban them. The Board’s
decision not to enter into discussions with Nasht as to how he might
make The Keeler Affair suitable for certification is therefore unusual,
lacking as it does those elements of consensus and compromise that
were hallmarks of the BBFC’s relationship with the production sector
under Trevelyan.
Nasht and the production company Topaz Films decided to press
ahead regardless. Costing approximately £100,000, The Keeler Affair
starred Yvonne Buckingham as Keeler and John Drew Barrymore as
Ward. Robert Spafford directed from a script he had written with
Ronald Maxwell andMatt White, twoDaily Mirror journalists. The Keeler
Affair was eventually filmed in Denmark as a result of the hostility
of British unions, particularly Equity, which took exception to the
possibility that Keeler might, as was at one time mooted, play herself in
the film. Although Topaz was prepared to exploit the cachet provided
by having to make The Keeler Affair outside Britain, and would later, in
international markets, trade shamelessly on its reputation as having
been banned in the United Kingdom, it submitted the film to the
BBFC on 18 December 1963 in the hope of being allowed to exhibit it
in what would surely have been its most lucrative market.
Given Trevelyan’s earlier advice, it could have come as little surprise
to Nasht that the BBFC rejected The Keeler Affair. Explaining the
Board’s decision, Trevelyan stressed that the film had been examined
on its own merits, and not simply pre-judged as a cinematic adjunct
to a political sex scandal. Even so, the Board would ‘not be prepared
to issue a certificate for the film’ as The Keeler Affair presented ‘an
almost continuous picture of sordid vice, including sexual perversion,
and is, in the opinion of this Board, morally objectionable.’11 Lest
Nasht believe that judicious re-editing of the film might satisfy the
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BBFC, Trevelyan insisted that ‘even extensive cutting would not
produce a satisfactory solution, since there are several scenes, which
have some importance in continuity of narration, which would be
completely unacceptable.’ Trevelyan concluded by stating explicitly
that the BBFC’s decision would not be revisited: ‘In the circumstances
there is no point in your pursuing the matter with this Board.’12
Although Trevelyan had claimed in 1960 that the Board ‘cannot
assume responsibility for the guardianship of public morality’ and
could not reject ‘films that show behaviour which contravenes the
accepted moral code’ nor ‘legitimately refuse to pass films which
criticise “the Establishment’’’, he also made it clear that the censors
reserved the right to pronounce on which films were ‘not suitable for
public exhibition even to adults’ (1960: 63). Quite what might render
a film unsuitable was, clearly, contingent on a host of extra-cinematic
factors that had less to do with the formal content of the film than
the social and cultural context in which it was to be released, and
also on its likely audience. As Tracy Hargreaves has noted, Trevelyan
frequently adopted ‘some quite patrician and normative assumptions’
when it came to determining whether a film was to be certified (2012:
54), dividing cinema-goers into two categories, ‘intelligent people’
able to handle more complex and adult themes and content, and ‘the
great majority of cinema-goers’ who were not.13 In this, some of his
attitudes chimed – although less colourfully – with those expressed
by Mervyn Griffiths-Jones, who, as prosecuting counsel at the Lady
Chatterley’s Lover obscenity trial in 1960, famously asked the jury if
D. H. Lawrence’s book was one ‘that you would even wish your wife or
your servants to read?’ It was Nasht’s misfortune that The Keeler Affair
was submitted to the BBFC at a time when, as John Sutherland put
it, Britain was subject to ‘one of its periodic fits of punitive moralism
about “vice’’’, a fit that was prompted in part by the very scandal that
Nasht’s film was seeking to exploit (1982: 36). Needing to protect the
reputation of the film industry during a period in which there was
something akin to a witch-hunt for cultural materials which had the
potential to affront public morality – Fanny Hill was prosecuted under
the Obscene Publications Act in late 1963, a decision that the Labour
MP Leo Abse related directly to the moral convulsions prompted by
the Profumo affair14 – the BBFC felt discretion to be the better part
of valour. The producer Anthony Perry, for example, claimed that
Trevelyan advised him to ‘postpone’ submitting The Party’s Over to
the Board during the second half of 1963 as a direct consequence of
the Keeler affair – ‘[there’s] enough depravity around at the moment’
(Ardagh 1963: 1) – while in the People, 14 July 1963, Perry’s film was
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lumped together with The Keeler Affair as egregious examples of ‘the
more sordid type of “X’’ certificate films’.
Tribune’s J. D. S. Haworth attended a screening of The Keeler Affair
in Boston, Massachusetts, during the summer of 1964. Although in
Variety, 20 May 1964, the National Legion of Decency was reported
as condemning The Keeler Affair for its ‘irresponsible exploitation of a
contemporary sex scandal’, the film was passed for exhibition, with
many American cinemas seeking to highlight as attractions exactly
those elements that the Legion had found so abhorrent. Haworth
conceded that The Keeler Affair was ‘no masterpiece’ and ‘cheap
to a degree that hardly seemed possible’, but was adamant that,
despite these faults, ‘it should still be exhibited in this country [i.e.
Britain]’, arguing that ‘nothing in its content fell within the legitimate
considerations of the censor who has confused (or, more likely, had
confused for him) the difference between embarrassment and moral
indignation’ (1964: 15). It seems likely that Haworth’s attitude to
the film was, in part, politically motivated: Tribune was a left-leaning
publication, and he clearly regarded The Keeler Affair as a wasted
opportunity to lay bare the failings of the Conservative political elite
as represented by Profumo and Macmillan.
Haworth’s rebuke to the censor is the only explicit reference to the
BBFC’s December 1963 decision that I have been able to find in the
British press either at the time of the decision or in its immediate
aftermath. This, though, is not to say that Fleet Street had either
forgotten about or ceased to be interested in The Keeler Affair, and
in summer and autumn 1964, at least three reviews of the film were
published in British newspapers. None of these articles, however,
referred directly to the BBFC’s decision not to certify the film. In
the Guardian, 11 July 1964, Peter Preston’s review made great play
of the fact that he watched The Keeler Affair in Belgium, but offers
no explanation why – readers are left to form their own conclusions.
On 23 July, the Financial Times’s Elliott Stein referred repeatedly in
his piece to having seen the film in Paris, but was teasingly cryptic
about why he’d had to view it there, noting simply that The Keeler Affair
‘will probably never grace a single screen in Great Britain’, and that
this situation would change only if ‘Mr Trevelyan’ chose to ‘vouchsafe
[British cinemagoers] a peek at the film’. There is no mention of the
Board, and no attempt to explain who Trevelyan is – he might, for
instance, have been the film’s distributor. Consequently, the reference
remains oblique, understandable only to those in the know, and it is,
of course, difficult to judge how large a group this constituted as far
the readership of the Financial Times in the mid-1960s is concerned.
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On 11 October 1964, the Sunday Telegraph ran a caustic review of The
Keeler Affair written by Anthony Haden-Guest, who had, he informed
readers, watched the film at the Aloha cinema in Helsinki. Again, the
exact reasons why Haden-Guest had been obliged to travel to Finland
to see the film are left unexplained. The fact that the BBFC is not
mentioned in these reviews does not in itself provide conclusive proof
that British newspapers were instructed or encouraged to steer clear
of the subject, but the fact that none of them mentions the Board’s
decision while all make it clear that they had been obliged to watch the
film outside the United Kingdom is an intriguing coincidence.
The lack of mention of the BBFC is all the more curious given both
that so much attention had been paid to the film during its production
and that the film was inherently (although obliquely) political in
nature. Although it concentrated on the relationship between Keeler
and Ward rather than on the affair between Profumo and Keeler –
to the extent that John Drew Barrymore insisted that the film could
be understood as ‘a modern cross between Svengali and Pygmalion’
(Dodd 1963: 4) – The Keeler Affair arose out of a set of circumstances
that, due to the involvement of a government minister and a Soviet
diplomat, were intimately associated with the political culture of
the day and also with politics as a cultural phenomenon. Haworth
certainly saw the BBFC’s rejection of The Keeler Affair as a political
act, and criticised the British censor’s refusal to certify the film as ‘an
indefensible political extension of his duties’ (1964: 15, emphasis in
original).
Haworth did not state explicitly that the BBFC came under pressure
from the government or the political class to reject The Keeler Affair,
and I have not found any documentation in the archives to suggest that
the Board arrived at its decision anything other than independently.
However, given that Julian Petley (2013: 157–60; 2016a: 147–58) has
demonstrated that direct political interference in the workings and
policies of the BBFC was not limited to the pre-war period, as was
once supposed, but has carried on to much nearer the present day, it
would not necessarily be far-fetched to entertain the suggestion that
the BBFC was, directly or indirectly, made aware of the government’s
disapproval of a film on such a delicate and embarrassing subject.
Indeed, Fleet Street gossip posited that the Board had discouraged the
production of The Keeler Affair ‘on direct instructions from Downing
Street’, a rumour that Trevelyan went out of his way to deny in his
memoirs. Trevelyan also insisted that the BBFC had not sought out
instructions from ‘anyone connected with the Government’ but also
noted that it would have been reasonable for it to do so should it so
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have wished, ‘since we were not in any way under Government control’
(1973: 177–8).
Although this was, technically, true, it cannot be denied that the
BBFC swam in political waters. It often worked in consultation
with other bodies, both connected to and independent of the
state, to ensure that films did not break the various laws that
governed cinematic exhibition in Britain. Furthermore, its leadership,
particularly its presidents, ‘frequently had political connections’ in
order that the Board might work with the government and the civil
service to ensure that its voice was heard when it came to the drafting of
legislation that touched on questions of film censorship (Street 2000:
24–5). Lord Morrison of Lambeth, President of the BBFC between
1960 and 1965, had himself been Home Secretary, deputy Prime
Minister and leader of the London County Council; his appointment
was mooted by the Board precisely because of his political connections.
Yet the same connections that gave the Board access to Whitehall also
gave Whitehall access to the Board, not least because Morrison, like
his successor Lord Harlech, was appointed only after what Trevelyan
described as ‘private consultation with the Home Secretary and the
associations of local authorities’ (1973: 71). Clearly, both the BBFC and
the government saw it as being mutually beneficial that the president
of the BBFC was able to act as a conduit between them.
Haworth continued his attack on the BBFC in April 1965, reiterating
his claim that The Keeler Affair had been rejected on ‘political’ grounds,
and asserting that, in a conversation with Trevelyan, the censor had
‘readily admitted’ as much (1965a: 15). Trevelyan wrote to Tribune to
deny this, asserting: ‘I have never stated that the Board’s reason was
a “political one’’. Indeed in any public statement about this film I
have made it clear that the Board’s decision was made on ordinary
censorship grounds’ (1965: 8). This is, perhaps, a slightly disingenuous
statement, for in his memoirs, Trevelyan admitted that the Board
was concerned that it would open itself up to criticism if it passed a
film in which Profumo ‘featured prominently’. Political considerations
were evidently important, and Trevelyan’s relief that the film’s sexual
content provided the BBFC with alternative grounds to reject The
Keeler Affair is almost palpable (1973: 177).
Haworth was not prepared to back down and recalled a telephone
conversation with Trevelyan in August 1964 in which the censor
agreed that it [The Keeler Affair] was not beyond redemption by an
‘X’ certificate on the grounds of its semi-nude scenes and sniggering
dialogue . . . and agreed that the political inexpedience of allowing the
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film’s exhibition at that time – so close to the General Election – was
taken into account and weighed conclusively in the Board’s decision.
(1965b: 8)
Trevelyan might have pointed to the fact that when The Keeler Affair
was rejected in December 1963, it was not known when the general
election would take place and, therefore, that the election could have
played no part in the BBFC’s decision.15 Haworth, by contrast, might
have observed that British electoral law meant that the election had
to take place at some point before the end of October 1964, and that,
with this in mind, the BBFC did not want to run the risk of certifying
the film only to see Parliament dissolved soon afterwards. At the time
that Haworth claims to have spoken to Trevelyan, the election had
not been called, although Alec Douglas-Home, Macmillan’s successor,
had embarked on a lengthy pre-election campaign. If Haworth
couched his inquiry about The Keeler Affair in hypothetical terms, it
is possible that Trevelyan answered in a similar manner. From such
a conversation, misunderstandings might easily arise. As Guy Phelps
wryly commented, the disagreement between Haworth and Trevelyan
‘probably reflects no more than the dangers of interview by telephone’
(1975: 154).
Nevertheless, Haworth’s claims make it clear that, in certain circles,
the BBFC’s rejection of The Keeler Affair was considered to constitute an
act of political censorship; stopping the film from enjoying a general
release was part of an attempt to limit the cultural repercussions of
the Profumo scandal and so avoid causing any further embarrassment
to Profumo or the Establishment circles in which he had moved. This
was an idea that would be expressed more widely, and more forcefully,
when, in 1970, The Keeler Affair was rejected by the BBFC for a second
time.
‘Likely to corrupt and deprave’: The Keeler Affair and
the BBFC and GLC in 1969–70
In early 1969, the News of the World, then Britain’s biggest selling
Sunday newspaper, came under the ownership of Rupert Murdoch.
Murdoch was eager to increase both the paper’s profile and its sales,
and hit upon the idea of publishing an updated version of Keeler’s
memoirs, for which he paid £21,000. The first in a series of weekly
instalments was published on 28 September 1969 and, with Keeler in
the limelight once more, on 21 October 1969 the BBFC was asked to
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reassess The Keeler Affair in the hope that its distributors might be able
to exploit renewed public interest in its subject.16
Murdoch’s decision to publish the Keeler memoirs was intensely
controversial. Since his resignation, Profumo had dedicated himself
to charitable work in the East End of London, and it was felt that
by dragging his past indiscretions back into the limelight, the News
of the World was being unfair and wilfully hurtful. Indeed, much of
the coverage of the News of the World’s decision to publish Keeler’s
memoirs went out of its way not to mention Profumo by name;
he was most often referred to simply as a former cabinet minister,
although so intertwined were the public profiles of Keeler and Profumo
that it is doubtful that this offered him much protection. Although
the public’s continued interest in Keeler’s life was demonstrated
by the fact that the publication of her memoirs would boost the
News of the World’s weekly sales by some 300,000 copies, there does
appear to have been widespread sympathy for Profumo and a fair
degree of hostility directed at both Murdoch and Keeler (Petley
2016b: 252–5). Film-makers John Boulting, Sidney Gilliat and Frank
Launder, then directors of British Lion, had a letter published in The
Times, 25 September 1969, which proposed that as the events of the
Profumo affair ‘had now passed into a history whose pages should
properly, and fairly, remain closed during the lifetime of the principal
participants’ the decision to reanimate the scandal ‘suggests an act of
journalistic exhumation that is positively ghoulish’ (Keeler’s response
was published on 30 September). Claiming that ‘a considerable section
of public opinion is offended by the series’, on 2 October 1969 the
Independent Television Authority (ITA) banned ITV stations from
carrying commercials for the News of the World that mentioned Keeler
or her memoirs (quoted in Irwin 1969: 1). On 4 October, the Daily
Mirror quoted a News of the World spokesman who attacked the decision
as ‘censorship’ and an ‘abuse of the powers of the ITA’. Both the BBC
and ITV announced that planned appearances by Keeler had been
scrapped; Keeler regarded this as evidence that ‘someone, somewhere
[was] putting the pressure on’ (2002: 239).
By the time that The Keeler Affair was resubmitted to the BBFC, rights
in the film had been acquired by Parcon Distribution, which appears to
have been jointly owned by Tom Parkinson and David Conyers. Shortly
afterwards, ownership of The Keeler Affair was transferred to David
Conyers Productions, a company which counted among its directors
Conyers, Parkinson and also John Nasht.17 In October 1969, Trevelyan
informed Parkinson that before the BBFC came to a decision about
The Keeler Affair, he thought it ‘advisable’ to consult Lord Harlech.18
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The fact that Trevelyan sought guidance from Harlech, and was not
prepared to make a decision until the President had seen the film, gives
a clear indication that The Keeler Affair, the events it portrayed and
the lives it described were still deemed to be potentially contentious.19
Harlech, who had taken over from Morrison as the Board’s President
in 1965, was a former Conservative MP who, as David Ormsby-Gore,
had served alongside Profumo in Macmillan’s government, with both
of them for a short period acting as joint Ministers of State for
Foreign Affairs. It is unclear whether Trevelyan was aware of Harlech’s
connection to Profumo, but it seems unlikely that he would not have
acquainted himself with Harlech’s previous positions at the time of his
appointment. Whether or not Trevelyan was aware of it, Harlech’s link
to Profumo surely constituted a conflict of interest as far as The Keeler
Affair was concerned. Harlech, however, proved to be a difficult man
to pin down, and was not able to attend a screening of the film until
11 March 1970, with much of this delay the result of Harlech’s wedding
and subsequent honeymoon.
This tardiness must have been intensely frustrating for a distributor
seeking to exploit the renewed topicality of the film, but suited the
Board very well, as it permitted it to make and announce its decision
well after the storms of protest attending the News of the World’s
publication of the Keeler memoirs had blown over. Indeed, for all that
there was much public criticism of the News of the World and a feeling
among many newspapers that the Profumo affair was now probably
best left alone, sections of Fleet Street felt that the actions of the Press
Council, which had sought to dissuade the paper from publishing the
Keeler memoirs and then censured it when it did so, came close to
curtailing the freedom of the press. As the Daily Mail, 7 October 1969,
put it:
We regard the Keeler memoirs as sleazy and stale stuff. But that is no
argument for trying to censor them . . . Free speech means what it says. It
means freedom for silly or tasteless words just as for the wise and noble.
It is not for the law to decide questions of taste. Every journalist must
argue those out with his own conscience. And he must do so without fear
of ‘the men in power’.
When The Keeler Affair came before the BBFC for a second time, the
idea that the Establishment was trying to quash stories that it found
uncomfortable or embarrassing was, once again, current.
On 11 March 1970, Harlech was joined at the BBFC screening by
Trevelyan and the same two examiners who had rejected the film in
1963. The examiners’ report noted that although ‘a certain amount
240
The Keeler Affair
of material (about Profumo) has been added since we saw the film
in 1963’, changes to what was deemed acceptable in terms of sexual
content meant that ‘there was nothing in it that was now censorable.’20
Harlech and Goodman concurred that ‘on the face of it’, The Keeler
Affair did not appear libellous.21 (Although libel was not something
that the BBFC was required to consider, the Board treated films
that contained potentially libellous material in an extremely cautious
manner, wary of being dragged onto the front pages or into the
courts.) Further, the censors agreed that ‘by present day standards
the film would not be regarded as visually offensive to most of the
audiences that would go to this type of entertainment’.22 Under
Trevelyan, the BBFC had become a more liberal, and some might
suggest liberalising, organisation. Images of sexual activity (especially,
although not exclusively, heterosexual), nudity (especially, although
not exclusively, female) and dialogue of an adult nature had all
become, to varying degrees and within limits, more acceptable to the
Board. As such, The Keeler Affair’s shots of partial nudity, or sequences
suggestive of sexual activity, were no longer grounds for the BBFC to
reject the film; there was nothing contained in it that could not be put
out under an ‘X’ certificate.
The Keeler Affair was, however, rejected again, although it would be
early May 1970 before its distributors were informed of this fact. In
the intervening period, Trevelyan and Harlech, in consultation with
Goodman, sought to justify the Board’s decision, conscious that ‘the
exact wording’ of the letter outlining the grounds on which the BBFC
rejected the film was ‘important, since it may well be disclosed to
the Press’.23 For Trevelyan’s benefit, Harlech laid out the ‘wider social
grounds’ that underpinned his objections to The Keeler Affair:
I cannot believe that it is in the public interest of the film industry, that we
should give our approval to a piece which exploits a comparatively recent
series of court cases, as a result of which one man (the black musician)
gets a seven year prison sentence, another commits suicide and a proven
prostitute [sic] obtains world-wide notoriety.24
The fact that Keeler had been paid for her story, both by the press and
for the film, exercised Harlech, who thought it
grossly unethical [that Keeler should] make a profit out of the
exploitation of a story which brought ruin and even death to some of the
participants who have friends and relations still living. We at the Board
ought not to be seen to condone such activities.25
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Given that the death referred to by Harlech, that of Stephen Ward,
was little mourned by those in power at the time, but has since
come to be regarded by those such as Geoffrey Robertson (2013),
Anthony Summers and Stephen Dorril (2013) and Caroline Kennedy
and Phillip Knightley (2015) as a consequence of Establishment
scapegoating, at least some of the purported concern contained in
these words might be dismissed as little more than cant.
At a face-to-face meeting on 7 May 1970, Trevelyan informed
Conyers that the BBFC would reject The Keeler Affair, and three weeks
later the Board sent Conyers a letter laying out the reasons that had
informed its decision.26 The Board acknowledged that while it ‘could
not raise objection to the visual material or to the dialogue’, nor could
it ignore the broader ‘social issues’ generated by a possible release of
The Keeler Affair (that is, the payment of Keeler, the exploitation of a
recent court case and consideration of those affected by the Profumo
scandal). Thus:
If the Board passed the film for general exhibition it would be subjected
to public criticism . . . Since one of the reasons for the setting up of this
Board many years ago was to protect the industry from public criticism,
he believes that this is a matter about which we should be cautious.
Trevelyan stressed that this was a decision handed down by Lord
Harlech: ‘Lord Harlech has asked me to tell you that he does not
feel able to agree at the present time to the issuing of a certificate for
this film.’27 Trevelyan interacted with film-makers and distributors on
a daily basis, so wording the letter in this way might simply have been
an act of deflection, using Harlech as a lightning rod in order to make
his own job as Secretary slightly easier. It might also, though, suggest
that Trevelyan’s own liberalising instincts had, in this instance, come
into conflict with organisational objectives.
Trevelyan himself admitted to Today’s Cinema, 21 July 1970,
that refusing a certificate ‘for reasons of public policy’ was an
unprecedented decision for the Board. Further, Trevelyan told Today’s
Cinema, 29 January 1971, that the News of the World had been ‘censored
[sic] by the Press Council’ for publishing Keeler’s memoirs, and the
Board therefore ‘felt justified in not passing the film now because we
would put ourselves in the same position.’ This rather ignores the fact
that the BBFC was, in this situation, acting in a role equivalent to that
of the Press Council in the sense that it was acting as a guardian of
public morals and so determining what was deemed to be acceptable
for public consumption. The Board, though, seems to have been more
concerned that it might be thought of as acting in a manner akin to
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The News of the World – recalling public criticism of that paper, Trevelyan
conceded that ‘we thought that we would probably get the same’.
As it transpired, not certifying The Keeler Affair for public exhibition
brought about criticism too. Conyers, as Trevelyan had anticipated,
went to the press and was quoted in the People, 5 July 1970, as saying
that ‘it is a mild film, but this is probably the most world-shattering
story this century. I think the Board are on pretty dodgy ground
not issuing a certificate for the reasons they have given.’ Michael
Billington, writing in the Illustrated London News on 13 February 1971,
agreed, arguing that if ‘it is possible to read about Miss Keeler’s life,
it is surely logical to be allowed to see a film on the same subject.’
Whereas Trevelyan and Harlech claimed that the BBFC’s actions were
determined by ‘wider social grounds’, others, such as Derek Hill, saw
the Board as acting in a narrowly political manner. Hill was appalled
by the BBFC’s handling of The Keeler Affair, and proclaimed that the
Board’s refusal to certify it on grounds that did not relate to its actual
content constituted an act of ‘political censorship’, a description that
even The Times ‘reluctantly’ suspected was apt (quoted in Phelps 1975:
154). By way of protest, Hill organised a screening of The Keeler Affair
on 9 February 1971 at the New Cinema Club, which, as a private
members club, did not require the films it screened to be certified (Hill,
quoted in Bentley 1971: 31).28 On 5 February, the Morning Star railed
that The Keeler Affair’s tortured history offered ‘further evidence of the
folly and dangers of censorship’ and boldly declared that the film’s
problems ‘obviously’ had ‘more to do with the protection of political
interests than with the so-called protection of public morality’. In the
Guardian, 4 February 1971, Derek Malcolm applauded Hill’s gesture,
agreeing with Hill that the BBFC had refused to certify The Keeler
Affair for political reasons and that, consequently, watching the film
constituted an act of dissent. Both Hill and Malcolm agreed that this
was pretty much the only reason to watch the film. The Keeler Affair
was, Hill admitted cheerfully, ‘the worst film ever presented at this
establishment’ while Malcolm thought it ‘scarcely worth seeing even as
a curiosity’.29 (As far as I can ascertain, the New Cinema Club screening
remains the only occasion to date at which The Keeler Affair has been
exhibited before an audience in Britain.)
Having been told that the BBFC would not certify The Keeler Affair,
Conyers contacted the Greater London Council (GLC) with an eye
to gaining permission to exhibit the film at licensed cinemas in the
capital. In Britain, local councils retained the right to override the
Board’s classification of films when it came to their exhibition at
venues within their jurisdiction, although almost all of them accepted
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(and continue to accept) certification from the BBFC as proof that
a film is suitable for public display. Conyers’s decision, then, sought
to find a route to exhibition that would not have to pass through
the BBFC and its concerns about protecting the reputation of the
British film industry. Furthermore, Conyers was very clear about his
reasons for approaching the GLC: ‘According to applicant BBFC is
experiencing difficulty with this film due partly to possible political
repercussions and partly to public reaction to the . . . publication of
Miss K’s memoirs.’30
One of the first things that the GLC did upon receipt of Conyers’s
application was to contact the BBFC. On 17 May, that is more than
ten days before he wrote formally to advise Conyers of the BBFC’s
decision, Trevelyan sent the GLC a letter which admitted that The
Keeler Affair had ‘presented the Board with a problem’. Trevelyan noted
that the film could be passed as an ‘X’ were it not for ‘important
questions of social responsibility’, and then rehearsed the Board’s
position on ‘this girl’ (namely Keeler, then 27) receiving ‘further
publicity and possible financial benefit from the film’s exhibition.’ The
‘strong public reaction’ provoked by the News of the World’s publication
of Keeler’s memoirs was also invoked as a reason not to pass the film.31
The Keeler Affair was shown to members of the GLC’s Film Viewing
Sub-Committee on 13 July 1970. They, too, rejected the film, as did
Essex and Berkshire county councils, representatives of which had also
attended the screening. The following day, Peter Malynn, chair of the
sub-committee and Conservative member for Haringey, explained in
a press release how ‘the ban was made under a Council rule which
states that no film shall be exhibited at Council-licensed premises if
the effect, taken as a whole, tends to deprave and corrupt persons
who are likely to see it.’32 When Conyers learned, through the press,
of the GLC’s decision, he was incredulous. How, exactly, was the film
expected to deprave and corrupt? ‘If anything,’ he asserted, ‘it takes
a moral attitude which many people might regard as virtuous to the
point of prudishness.’33 Conyers received a terse reply containing a
copy of the press release and little else: ‘I have no further comment to
make on the Council’s decision.’34
If the GLC was reluctant to talk directly to Conyers about its
decision, it was far less reticent about talking to the press. Speaking to
the London Evening Standard, Malynn described how The Keeler Affair
– which he called ‘incredibly dull, very bad, with no entertainment
value whatever’ – had made him feel ‘a bit morally sick’. This, the
Standard noted on 16 July 1970, was in itself no grounds for banning
the film, so Malynn was asked to expand upon the reasons why it
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might be expected to deprave and corrupt. In response, he claimed
that a film ‘showing “that you can get away with it in real life’’ might
have a bad effect on young girls coming up to London’. Elsewhere,
Malynn pointed to ‘a scene which shows pot smoking’ to justify the
sub-committee’s decision.35 All in all, these seemed fairly innocuous
grounds on which to prohibit the public exhibition of a film. In The
Listener, 11 February 1971, Gavin Millar called the GLC’s actions a
‘transparent smokescreen’– it should be noted that, at the time, the
GLC had a Conservative majority – and reiterated claims that this was
in all likelihood an act of political censorship, making a much bolder
claim regarding the reasons for it: ‘Ward was made a scapegoat and
this uncomfortable truth, it seems, must be suppressed.’
The sub-committee was not unanimous in its decision, and at least
one member put forward a dissenting opinion. Although no fan of The
Keeler Affair, which he thought to be ‘a pathetic film, not worth banning
except to prevent boredom’, Ellis Hillman, a Labour councillor, called
the publicly stated reasons for refusing a certificate ‘ridiculous’. Rather,
he said, ‘if they . . . had mentioned Profumo, that would have been
the right reason.’ This led the Standard to ask on 16 July 1970 if the
members of the sub-committee had in mind ‘the thought that it would
be wrong at this stage to drag up once more the Profumo affair’.
Such a public expression of dissent from within the GLC cannot but
have fed Conyers’s growing sense of injustice. Furthermore, the New
Cinema Club screening in February 1971 was, as noted above, widely
discussed in the press in terms that were not entirely sympathetic
to those who would prevent The Keeler Affair enjoying a widespread
release. On 6 April 1971, Conyers arranged to meet with Malynn
in the hope of persuading the GLC to reconsider its decision. This
meeting was described as ‘unfortunate’ by Mark Patterson, now chair
of the Film Viewing Sub-Committee, since ‘it was clear that the [GLC’s]
position was very precarious and likely to lead to misunderstandings.’36
Misunderstandings did, indeed, arise. Conyers pressed for a more
detailed explanation of how the film might deprave and corrupt,
and pointed to press reaction to the ban to strengthen his position;
no satisfactory explanation appears to have been forthcoming. When
Conyers started to talk about ‘political hypocrisy’, Malynn fanned the
flames of the distributor’s ire by asking him ‘what he understood
by the phrase’.37 Conyers then claimed that he had infiltrated the
Council’s screening of The Keeler Affair and alleged ‘“collusion’’ among
the various authorities etc.’ before stalking out, ‘stating that he was
among political gangsters and uttering vague threats about the Council
hearing from his solicitors.’38
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A letter from Conyers’s solicitor was duly dispatched. This also
described the way in which the meeting had panned out as
‘unfortunate’ and conceded that Conyers’s behaviour might have
been counterproductive: ‘It would appear that the discussion at the
meeting took a course not entirely relevant to our client’s object –
namely to seek reconsideration of the [Council’s] decision’.39 Conyers’s
conduct at his meeting with Malynn is unlikely to have won him
any new friends at the GLC, but it is also unlikely to have affected
the sub-committee’s decision to refuse to revisit the film. Rather,
two factors were uppermost in the Council’s mind. First was the
desire to demonstrate that the Council could not simply be pushed
around ‘if enough pressure is exerted’.40 Second was the belief that
the Film Viewing Sub-Committee was under no obligation to entertain
Conyers’s request for a second assessment; its purpose was, essentially,
‘to see films . . . “on appeal’’ from decisions of the British Board of
Film Censors’ and, as such, was the final court of appeal and its
decisions could not be overturned.41 With the GLC having prohibited
the exhibition of The Keeler Affair in London, there were few options
left to Conyers as he sought to gain a return on his investment. With
licensed cinemas beyond his reach, Conyers started to hawk the film
around club cinemas which specialised in sexually explicit material.
In late July 1970, the directors of the Tatler Cinema Club, a chain of
sex cinemas, watched The Keeler Affair but decided against screening
it in their venues. Conyers found that time was against him; a film
that had in 1963 been denied certification on the grounds of its sexual
themes and imagery was, by the end of the decade, pretty tame stuff.
As G. W. Rhodes of the Tatler cinema club told Conyers: ‘Our views
are not those of the Censorship Authorities, but we feel that there is
too little overt sex in this film for it to be a real interest to our . . .
members.’42
Conclusion
In 1964, Raymond Durgnat lamented the tendency of so many British
film-makers to remain, politically speaking, so non-committal on
potentially controversial issues: ‘This neutrality’, he proclaimed, ‘often
implies obscurantism and complaisance . . . To sit on the fence is a
failure to tackle the theme properly.’ To leave film in the hands of those
who sought only to entertain was to risk marginalising the belief that a
cinema of conviction was not only possible but, in some cases, actively
desirable. Durgnat recounted a conversation he had with an unnamed
British director, to whom he posed the question: ‘If you had a chance,
246
The Keeler Affair
would you make a film based on the Profumo Affair?’ He continued:
‘The response was three-stage. First, what we might call the glare of
silence; then, “Oh no, I couldn’t possibly . . . ’’; and then a wistful: “But
what a dramatic story it would make . . . ’’. And last a sudden recovery:
“Ah, but what about Parnell . . . ?’’’ Durgnat described this ‘fighting
retreat from today’s bannerlines to yesterday’s now innocuous scandals’
as being ‘all too typical’: ‘The present,’ he observed laconically, ‘is
so vulgar, the past so romantic’ (1964: 9). We might add to this:
the present, with its opportunities for libel suits and its aggressive
lawyers, is so contentious, the past so much less likely to antagonise
the censor.
The reluctance of more accomplished British film-makers in the
first-half of the 1960s to tackle directly an issue such as the Profumo
affair left the field open to exploitation film producers such as John
Nasht and companies such as Topaz Films. The result was, artistically
and narratively, patchy, and it is likely that even if it had made it to
British cinema screens, The Keeler Affair would probably have remained
little more than a curio, notable almost entirely for its desire to put
Keeler herself on the screen and its shameless attempt to cash in on a
famous scandal. But the fact remains that The Keeler Affair did not make
it to British cinema screens, and this matters, not least because the way
in which the film was treated by the BBFC, which both discouraged its
production and then twice rejected it, gives rise to the uncomfortable
suspicion that it was decided that The Keeler Affair might best be swept
under the carpet. Indeed, this accords with the treatment of Keeler
herself, who was treated very badly in the wake of the Profumo scandal
(Davenport-Hines 2013: 340–2). By failing to certify The Keeler Affair,
the BBFC no doubt acted in its own organisational interests as the
protector of the British film industry, as well as what it believed to
be the wider interests of the British cinema-going public and the
society that they inhabited. As such, the decisions relating to The Keeler
Affair would appear to conform to the idea that the BBFC reaches its
decisions in part as a result of forces and institutions acting upon it
(Petley 2011: 4). In 1960, Derek Hill decried what he saw as the BBFC’s
supine attitude in relation to powerful political institutions, stating that
it was ‘responsive to the influence of successive Governments while
maintaining the appearance of independence’ (1960: 53). In response
Trevelyan, thinking no doubt of direct political interference in the
work of the BBFC rather than the indirect influence of shared attitudes
and expectations, was quick to reject this claim, arguing that the Board
‘claims to be independent, and it is independent’ (1960: 62). But then,
to paraphrase Mandy Rice-Davies, he would say that, wouldn’t he?
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Notes
1. Mort provides a detailed exploration of Ward’s character and role in the Profumo
affair (2010: 284–95).
2. For analysis of Scandal see Aldgate and Richards (2002: 219–33) and Babington
(2005: 197–206).
3. Recent contributions to the extensive literature on the Profumo affair include
Mort (2010: 281–348), Sandbrook (2006: 638–81) and Davenport-Hines (2013).
For contemporary accounts, see Young (1963), Irving et al. (1963) and Crawford
(1963). Many of the central figures in the scandal have published their version (or,
in Keeler’s case, versions) of events: Keeler (1989), Keeler (2002, updated 2012),
Rice-Davies (1964), Edgecombe (2002) and Ivanov (1992). A family history of the
Profumos has been written by David Profumo (2006).
4. John Vassall was an admiralty clerk blackmailed into spying for the USSR. When
he was arrested in September 1962, his homosexuality was exposed, and many
newspapers carried salacious stories of his relationship with Thomas Galbraith, a
junior minister in Macmillan’s government. A judicial tribunal cleared Galbraith
and found that press reports of impropriety between Vassall and Galbraith were
unfounded. When, in March 1963, two journalists refused to name their sources for
stories about Vassall, they were jailed; this put the papers ‘in a mood for revenge’
(Thomas 2005: 38–40).
5. On The Keeler Affair as an element of the popular culture that sought to exploit the
Profumo scandal, see Farmer (forthcoming).
6. For recent takes on the BBFC in the 1960s see Hargreaves (2012) and Aldgate and
Robertson (2005: esp. 129–55).
7. Keeler incorporated herself in June 1963, prompting Harold Wilson to ask if he
should ‘refer to her as Miss Christine Keeler Ltd.’ Parliamentary Debates: Commons,
17 June 1963, vol. 679, col. 53.
8. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: John Trevelyan to John Nassht (sic.), 6 May 1963.
9. The uncodified nature of some elements of the BBFC’s work allowed it to
adopt an ‘elastic’ approach to its business (Hunnings, 1967: 131). As Trevelyan
noted in 1963: ‘We could, of course, have rules which were applied strictly and
indiscriminately to all films, but I firmly believe that this would lead to unintelligent
censorship’ (quoted in Hargreaves 2012: 57).
10. Film Finances Archive: Band of Thieves: John Trevelyan to Lance Comfort, 9 May
1962.
11. Even by the standards of the day, the titillation offered by The Keeler Affair was pretty
tame. As the Financial Times observed of the film on 23 July 1964, ‘its nudities add
up to only eight breasts seen simultaneously for only four seconds.’
12. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: John Trevelyan to John Nasht, 20 December 1963.
13. Trevelyan to Michael Relph, 18 May 1960, cited in Hargreaves (2012: 57–8).
14. Leo Abse, Parliamentary Debates: Commons, 3 June 1964, vol. 695, cols. 1189–90.
15. The notion that popular culture might influence the 1964 general election was also
evidenced by the cancellation of the satirical show That Was The Week That Was and
Harold Wilson’s lobbying of the BBC to alter the transmission time of Steptoe and
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Son on election night, a programme whose popularity with the working class he
feared might harm the Labour turnout (Briggs 1995: 373–3, 447–8).
16. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: John Nasht to Trevelyan, 21 October 1969.
17. Conyers and Nasht worked together as producers, alongside Robert Stigwood, on
the first London production of Hair, which had opened at the Shaftesbury Theatre
in September 1968 and ran for almost 1,200 performances.
18. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: Trevelyan to Parkinson, 23 October 1969.
19. By 1963, Trevelyan noted, only a film that ‘presents problems’ would be viewed by
the President (quoted in Hunnings 1967: 131).
20. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: examiners’ report, 11 March 1970.
21. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: Harlech to Trevelyan, 31 March 1970.
22. Ibid.
23. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: Trevelyan to Harlech, 3 April 1970.
24. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: Harlech to Trevelyan, 31 March 1970.
25. Ibid.
26. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: handwritten note by Trevelyan, 7 May 1970;
Trevelyan to Conyers, 28 May 1970.
27. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: Trevelyan to Conyers, 28 May 1970.
28. This was not uncommon practice by this time, although it was usually films
containing sexual content deemed too explicit to be certified that circumvented
the classification system in this manner.
29. This criticism is perhaps a little unfair. The Keeler Affair is certainly not an
outstanding piece of cinema, but it is wittier and more inventive than it had any
right to be given its low budget and the limited formal or aesthetic ambitions of
many exploitation film-makers. As Elliot Stein noted in his review in the Financial
Times, 23 July 1964, The Keeler Affair is ‘more than trash, if less than art’.
30. LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373: Note by [illegible], 12 May 1970.
31. LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373: Trevelyan to E. W. Newberry, 19 May 1970.
32. LMA: GLC Press Release, no. 361: ‘Christine Keeler Film Banned’, 14 July
1970. The language of the decision relates directly to Section 1 of the Obscene
Publications Act 1959, which sought to prohibit the dissemination of materials the
effect of which is, ‘if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt’.
33. LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373: David Conyers to Director-General, GLC, 16 July 1970.
34. LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373: Director-General to David Conyers, 20 July 1970.
35. Hornsey Journal, 17 July 1970. Press cutting in LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373.
36. LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373: Mark Patterson to A. C. W. Maycock, 22 April 1971.
37. LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373: GLC memo, 20 April 1971.
38. LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373: GLC memo, 8 April 1971.
39. LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373: Crane and Hawkins to Peter Malynn, 14 April 1971.
40. LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373: Mark Patterson to A. C. W. Maycock, 22 April 1971.
41. LMA: GLC/DG/EL/01/373: A. C. W. Maycock to Mark Patterson, 20 April 1971.
42. BBFC Archive: The Keeler Affair: G. W Rhodes to David Conyers, 30 July 1970.
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